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ABSTRACT 
 
Using a large Australian social survey, combined with precise data on neighbourhood 
characteristics, I explore the factors that affect trust at a local level (‘localised trust’) and 
at a national level (‘generalised trust’). Trust is positively associated with the 
respondent’s education, and negatively associated with the amount of time spent 
commuting. At a neighbourhood level, trust is higher in affluent areas, and lower in 
ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous communities, with the effect being stronger 
for linguistic heterogeneity than ethnic heterogeneity. Linguistic heterogeneity reduces 
localised trust for both natives and immigrants, and reduces generalised trust only for 
immigrants. Instrumental variables specifications show similar results. By contrast with 
the United States, there is no apparent relationship between trust and inequality across 
neighbourhoods in Australia. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In places where people trust one another, institutions, markets and societies seem to work 
better. Since complete contracts will often be infeasible, high trust societies can potentially 
overcome a costly market failure. Empirically, trust has been found to be associated with less 
corruption and more effective bureaucracies (La Porta et al 1997), higher rates of economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer 1997; Hjerrpe 1998), financial development (Guiso et al 2004), 
and better education systems (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999). At the very least, trust 
appears to be a useful proxy variable for a variety of outcomes that are important to 
economists.  
 
An emerging literature on the determinants of trust has examined variation across countries 
(Knack and Keefer 1997; Uslaner 2002; Leigh 2005), and across cities within the United 
States (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). This paper makes three new contributions to that 
literature. First, it estimates the effect of income, inequality, ethnic heterogeneity and 
linguistic heterogeneity at a neighbourhood level, in contrast to earlier studies conducted at 
the country or city level. Second, it focuses on two distinct types of trust – trust in those who 
live in the same neighbourhood (‘localised trust’), and trust in those who live in the same 
country (‘generalised trust’). Third, it analyses trust within Australia, expanding the scope of 
a literature that has been focused primarily on the US. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical and 
empirical literature on determinants of trust. Section III outlines the data and presents 
descriptive statistics. Section IV estimates the impact on trust of individual-level and 
neighbourhood-level factors. As a robustness check, Section V shows results from an 
instrumental variable specification in which mobility is taken to be endogenous at a 
neighbourhood level, but constrained at a regional level. The final section concludes.  
 
II. What Factors Might Affect Trust? 
 
Several theories have been propounded to explain trust at an individual level. Trust may be 
driven by morals and culture, which are likely to be correlated with individual characteristics 
such as income, education, employment and age.1 Those who are vulnerable to 
discrimination on the basis of their gender or race could be less trusting. And trust might be 
higher for those who have lived for longer in an area, and are hence more socially and 
culturally integrated.2
 
At a community level, a rise in mean income could be expected to be associated with 
increased trust, either because richer communities tip towards the high-trust equilibrium, or 
because they spend more on local public goods. Inequality may also affect trust by creating a 
perception of injustice (Brockner and Siegel 1996), or because individuals feel more 
comfortable interacting with others who have similar levels of income or wealth.  
 
Ethnic diversity might also be associated with lower levels of trust. This could occur because 
those in homogenous communities have similar tastes, because members of the majority 
group have an aversion to heterogeneity, or because diverse communities find it more 
difficult to enforce a system of social sanctions. Another possibility is that what matters most 
is not heterogeneity in physical appearance, but the ability to communicate. Linguistic 
heterogeneity has the potential to create what game theorists have called ‘garbling’, in which 
the equilibrium payoffs fall as the quality of information declines (Blackwell and Girshik 
1954; Kandori 1989; Cook and Cooper 2003).  
 
Assessing the community-level hypotheses across US cities, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) 
find that average income is positively associated with trust, while inequality and racial 
heterogeneity are negatively associated with trust.3 When inequality and racial heterogeneity 
are both included in the model, only race is significant, with a one standard deviation increase 
in racial heterogeneity associated with a 3 percentage point fall in trust. Across countries, 
Leigh (2005) finds that while both inequality and ethnic heterogeneity are negatively 
associated with trust, it is inequality which dominates when both are included in the model, a 
finding that holds true even after instrumenting for inequality. 
                                                 
1 Another approach is that of Boone, De Brabander and van Witteloostuijn (1999), who find that particular 
personality types are strongly related to an individual’s behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma games. For an 
extensive discussion of trust games, see Camerer (2003). 
2 Experimental evidence supports the ‘folk theorem’ result – that the probability of maintaining a high-trust 
equilibrium falls when a high fraction of one’s partners are changed after each round: Cohen, Riolo and Axelrod 
(2001). 
3 Similarly, Costa and Kahn (2003b) that the fall in volunteering and group membership in the US between the 
1950s and the 1990s was primarily attributable to rising inequality and ethnic heterogeneity. 
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 Several studies have observed a negative relationship between racial/ethnic heterogeneity and 
the provision of public goods. Some of these studies have focused on developed countries. In 
fruit-picking teams on a UK farm, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) find that ethnic 
heterogeneity lowers productivity. Across US counties, Vigdor (2004) finds that higher 
ethnic fractionalization is associated with a lower rate of completing and returning the 2000 
Census questionnaire, an action which secures significant federal grants for the community. 
Investigating the factors that lead to the creation of US political jurisdictions such as school 
districts, Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) find that racially heterogeneous counties are more 
willing to forego the economies of scale that come from consolidation. Analysing companies 
that served in the US civil war, Costa and Kahn (2003a) find that ethnic diversity was 
correlated with higher desertion rates.  
 
Other studies on the relationship between diversity and public goods have looked at 
developing nations. Across Indian regions, Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2005) find that 
more caste or religious fractionalization is associated with lower levels of public goods 
provision. Across communities in Northern Pakistan, Khwaja (2002) finds that infrastructure 
projects are better maintained where there is less heterogeneity in terms of clan, religious and 
political divisions. Across Kenyan school districts, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) find that 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization is associated with worse school facilities and less voluntary 
fundraising. And across countries, Easterly and Levine (1997) find a negative correlation 
between ethnic fractionalization and growth, which they attribute to ethnic diversity making 
it more difficult for communities to agree on the provision of public goods and pro-growth 
policies. 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
To measure trust, I use data from the Australian Community Survey (ACS), conducted in 
1997-98. The survey asked two questions about trust. All 6500 respondents were asked 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘Generally speaking, you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with most Australians’, and one-quarter of the sample (1580 respondents) 
were asked whether they agreed with the statement ‘Generally speaking, most Australians 
can be trusted’. For respondents who were asked both questions, the correlation is 0.4. Given 
that the former question has a larger sample size, I therefore opt to use it instead. Replicating 
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the analysis with the latter question does not materially affect the results, though statistical 
significance decreases somewhat. 
 
Respondents are coded as trusting if they disagreed with the statement ‘Generally speaking, 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with most Australians’.4 The ACS also asked a parallel 
question with reference to ‘people in my local area’. Results for localised trust and 
generalised trust are presented separately. Although the literature has tended to focus on 
generalised trust, localised trust is likely to be more important for certain outcomes, such as 
local funding decisions, and the efficacy of non-profit organizations. 
 
What is the ‘Generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with…’ question really 
measuring? Glaeser et al (2000) survey a group of Harvard undergraduates, and then ask 
them to play a trust game. They find that the question used in the General Social Survey 
(‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?’) actually measures how trustworthy the respondent is, rather 
than how trusting of others they are. Similarly, Karlan (2005) finds that Peruvian respondents 
who agree that most people can be trusted are less likely to default on their microcredit loans. 
It is likewise possible that the question used in this paper is actually measuring how 
trustworthy rather than how trusting the respondent is. Readers who wish to interpret the 
results in this paper as such should feel free to do so, though it makes little difference when 
interpreting the effect of neighbourhood-level factors. 
 
The ACS also includes a number of measures of individual characteristics, including sex, age, 
education, birthplace, hours of work, and commuting time. While the ACS does not include a 
measure of income (except for a very small sub-sample of respondents), it does include an 
indicator for the respondent’s occupation, at approximately the one-digit level.5 The survey 
also has a precise geographical identifier – the respondent’s postal code, which generally 
                                                 
4 In international surveys of interpersonal trust, Australia’s ranking is about average for a rich nation. For 
example, in the European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File (1995-2000), people in 81 countries 
were asked: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people?’. Australia ranked 16th, with 40% agreeing that most people could be trusted, 
above Britain (30%), Canada (39%) and the US (36%), but below Japan (43%), New Zealand (49%) and 
Denmark (67%). The unweighted country average was 28%.  
5 The 13 occupations are: manager-10 employees or more; manager-less than 10 employees; professional 
working with people; professional working with technology; office/business/shop-supervising others; 
office/business/shop-not supervising; foreman/supervisor; skilled trades; semi skilled manual worker; other 
manual worker; farmer; agricultural worker; and never had a job. 
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corresponds to their suburb. The average ACS respondent lives in a postal area of 
approximately 20,000 people. For ease of explication, I will refer to these areas as 
‘neighbourhoods’. 
 
Using the 1996 Australian census (the closest census to the ACS survey), it is possible to 
determine characteristics of the respondent’s neighbourhood. For the 1996 census, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics published a full tabulation of income, birthplace and language 
spoken at home by postal code (ABS 1997).6 Using these data, it is possible to create 
measures of income, inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, and linguistic heterogeneity for small 
geographic areas, unaffected by sampling problems.  
 
Income is the log mean weekly income among individuals in the respondent’s 
neighbourhood, based on gross personal income from all sources (including pensions and 
allowances). Inequality is measured using the gini coefficient. The gini is particularly 
appropriate in this instance, since it can be interpreted as half the income gap between any 
two randomly selected individuals in an area (eg. if the gini is 0.3, the expected gap between 
any two individuals is 60 percent of mean income). Ethnic heterogeneity and linguistic 
heterogeneity are measured using a Herfindahl-type fractionalization index. Where sej is the 
share of ethnic group e in neighbourhood j, . The fractionalization index 
in a given neighbourhood measures the chance that two randomly selected individuals are in 
a different ethnic or linguistic group – and is hence analogous to the gini coefficient.
∑
=
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Two measures of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity are used. First, I calculate a measure of 
ethnic fractionalization based on country of birth. The census classifies respondents as born 
in Australia, or in 22 broad regions of the world (eg. Northern America, Southern Asia). 
Second, I form a measure of linguistic fractionalization based on whether the respondent 
speaks a language other than English at home. Those who speak only English at home are 
classified as one subgroup, 24 other languages are separately identified, and a final category 
identifies ‘other’ languages. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Notably, the 
                                                 
6 Whether respondents moved in the previous five years was asked in the census, but is not tabulated at a postal 
code level. 
7 For more detail on the fractionalization index, see Alesina et al 2003. An alternative would be to use a 
polarization index – which reaches its maximum when there are two groups of equal size (see for example the 
discussion of religious polarization in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002). Replicating the analysis in this paper 
with such a measure does not materially affect the results. 
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standard deviation of inequality and ethnic fractionalization across Australian 
neighbourhoods is similar to the standard deviation of these measures across US cities 
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Appendix A). 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics   
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Individual-level variables   
Trust in people in the local area 0.499 0.500 
Trust in most Australians 0.576 0.494 
Female  0.514 0.500 
Age 53.059 16.807 
Born overseas 0.222 0.415 
Years of education 12.725 2.308 
Unemployed  0.025 0.157 
Moved in the past 10 years 0.648 0.478 
Hours of travelling per week 6.396 5.013 
Hours of work per week 25.908 20.912 
Neighbourhood-level variables   
Mean weekly income 397.905 78.813 
Inequality (Gini) 0.446 0.022 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.370 0.161 
Linguistic fractionalization 0.233 0.201 
Population of neighbourhood 19,962 14,765 
Region-level variables   
Mean weekly income 394.597 54.257 
Inequality (Gini) 0.453 0.012 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.376 0.144 
Linguistic fractionalization 0.248 0.176 
Population of region 463,331 415,922 
Sources: 1997-98 Australian Community Survey and 1996 Australian Census.  
Notes:  
1. All statistics are weighted using person-weights in the ACS. 
2. Sample size is 6500 individuals, spread across 692 neighbourhoods, and 52 regions. 
 
Figures 1 to 4 show the neighbourhood-level associations between trust and income, 
inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and linguistic fractionalization. Despite the large sample 
size, there are some neighbourhoods for which all the ACS respondents report the same level 
of trust, so the average level of trust is either 0 or 1.  
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These scatterplots provide some sense of the patterns in the data. Figure 1 shows that across 
neighbourhoods, trust is positively correlated with average income, while Figure 2 suggests a 
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slight positive relationship between trust and inequality. Both the fractionalization measures 
are negatively correlated with trust, with the relationship appearing to be somewhat weaker 
for ethnic fractionalization (Figure 3) than for linguistic fractionalization (Figure 4). 
 
IV. Who trusts? 
 
Although the graphs above provide suggestive evidence of the relationship between 
neighbourhood characteristics and trust, it is preferable to hold constant the individual’s own 
characteristics when estimating the impact of regional characteristics. Where P(Trust) is the 
probability that individual i in neighbourhood j agrees that most people can be trusted, X is a 
vector of individual characteristics (gender, education, age, whether born overseas, 
occupation, whether unemployed, mobility, travel time, work hours), and Y is a vector of 
neighbourhood-level characteristics (various combinations of average income, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, and inequality), the equation to be estimated is: 
 
P(Trust)ij = α + βXij + δYj + εij        (1) 
 
Since a primary focus of this paper is on neighbourhood-level characteristics, standard errors 
are clustered at a neighbourhood level. 
 
(i) Individual Characteristics 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present results from a probit model of the factors associated with localised 
trust and generalised trust.8 At an individual level, an extra year of education is associated 
with a 1½-2 percentage point increase in both types of trust. An additional 10 hours of 
commuting per week is associated with a 4-5 percentage point fall in trust – a finding 
consistent with Putnam’s theory that commuting has an adverse impact on social capital 
(Putnam 2000). An additional 10 hours of work per week is associated with a 2 percentage 
point increase in trust.9  
 
                                                 
8 In their univariate analyses of the ACS dataset, Hughes, Bellamy and Black (1999, 2000) discuss several 
variables that are correlated with trust. Their findings are broadly consistent with those presented here. 
9 However, since the regression controls for occupation but not income, the coefficient on working hours may 
also be capturing an intra-occupational income effect.  
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Table 2: Localised Trust (Probit) 
Dependent variable: 0 if agrees that ‘Generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with most people in my 
local area’, 1 if disagrees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age2/1000 -0.051** -0.051** -0.041* -0.039 -0.039 -0.042* 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Born overseas -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.027 -0.03 -0.029 0.023 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) 
Years of education 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Unemployed -0.045 -0.045 -0.049 -0.046 -0.046 -0.044 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) 
Moved in last 10 years -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Hours travelling per week -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hours working per week 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Neighbourhood income 0.259*** 0.265*** 0.330*** 0.278*** 0.274*** 0.268*** 
 (0.046) (0.050) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048) (0.044) 
Inequality  -0.003   0.004  
  (0.009)   (0.009)  
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.052***  -0.003  
   (0.009)  (0.016)  
Linguistic fractionalization    -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.047*** 
    (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) 
Linguistic fractionalization      -0.040** 
* Born overseas      (0.017) 
Occupation indicators? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6500 6500 6500 6500 6500 6500 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Sources: 1997-98 Australian Community Survey and 1996 Australian Census.  
Notes: 
1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Coefficients are marginal 
probabilities from a probit model. Robust standard errors, clustered at the neighbourhood level, in parentheses.  
2. Inequality, ethnic fractionalization and linguistic fractionalization are normed so that their coefficients 
represent the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase.  
3. Occupation indicators cover the 13 occupational categories listed in the ACS. 
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Table 3: Generalised Trust (Probit) 
Dependent variable: 0 if agrees that ‘Generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with most Australians’, 1 
if disagrees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age2/1000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.002 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Born overseas -0.025 -0.025 -0.021 -0.017 -0.022 0.041* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) 
Years of education 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Unemployed -0.132** -0.132** -0.132** -0.132** -0.130** -0.130** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) 
Moved in last 10 years 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.024 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Hours travelling per week -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hours working per week 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Neighbourhood income 0.181*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 0.184*** 0.160*** 0.172*** 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.043) 
Inequality  -0.004   -0.001  
  (0.009)   (0.008)  
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.007  0.025*  
   (0.008)  (0.014)  
Linguistic fractionalization    -0.016** -0.036*** -0.003 
    (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) 
Linguistic fractionalization      -0.043*** 
* Born overseas      (0.016) 
Occupation indicators? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6500 6500 6500 6500 6500 6500 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Sources: 1997-98 Australian Community Survey and 1996 Australian Census.  
Notes: 
1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Coefficients are marginal 
probabilities from a probit model. Robust standard errors, clustered at the neighbourhood level, in parentheses.  
2. Inequality, ethnic fractionalization and linguistic fractionalization are normed so that their coefficients 
represent the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase.  
3. Occupation indicators cover the 13 occupational categories listed in the ACS. 
 
Some individual-level factors appear to affect generalised and localised trust differently. 
Being unemployed is associated with a 13 percentage point fall in generalised trust, but has 
no statistically significant effect on localised trust. This may reflect two offsetting effects of 
being jobless – frustration at society at large, but also the fact that the unemployed tend to 
spend more time in their local area. The reverse is true of those born overseas, who are no 
less trusting of Australians in general, but tend to be 5 percentage points less trusting of those 
in their local area (though this is no longer statistically significant once neighbourhood-level 
characteristics are controlled for). Perhaps immigrants have a tendency to feel grateful to the 
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population at large for permitting them to enter the country, but suffer discrimination at a 
local level, or have difficulty adapting into unfamiliar surroundings and building trust with 
their neighbours.  
 
There is no statistically significant association between trust and gender – suggesting that 
gender disparities in Australia are not sufficient to create significant gaps in trust levels 
between men and women. The relationship between trust and age is also approximately zero 
(although the age2 term is statistically significant in some specifications in Table 2, the 
magnitude of the coefficient is tiny). Lastly, I find no evidence that those who have moved 
house in the past decade tend to be less trusting. If the experimental findings on population 
mobility and trust are borne out in reality, it is therefore more likely that they operate through 
the overall stability of the community, rather than through an ‘untrusting mover’ effect. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain precise neighbourhood-level population mobility 
data from the 1996 census. 
 
(ii) Neighbourhood Income, Inequality and Ethnic Diversity 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results for generalised and localised trust. At a neighbourhood level, 
mean income is positively associated with trust: a 10 percent increase in mean income is 
associated with a 3 percentage point increase in localised trust, and a 2 percentage point 
increase in generalised trust. However, extra care should be take in interpreting the 
coefficient on neighbourhood income here, since the specification controls only for individual 
occupation, and not for individual income. It is therefore possible that part of the observed 
‘neighbourhood income effect’ is merely an aggregation of (intra-occupational) individual-
level income effects.  
 
For inequality, I find no evidence that people in more unequal neighbourhoods in Australia 
tend to be less trusting. In most estimates in Tables 2 and 3, the standard error of the 
coefficient on inequality is sufficiently small as to make it possible to rule out effects larger 
than ±1 percentage point when inequality increases by one standard deviation. 
 
There is a strong negative relationship between localised trust and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (Table 2). A one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization is 
associated with a 5 percentage point fall in localised trust, while a one standard deviation 
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increase in linguistic fractionalization is associated with a 6 percentage point fall in localised 
trust. Both are significant at the 1 percent level. When inequality and the two measures of 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization are included in the regression, linguistic fractionalization 
remains highly significant, with the coefficient virtually unchanged, while the coefficients on 
inequality and ethnic fractionalization become small and insignificant. This suggests that 
sharing a common ethnic heritage may be less important for localised trust than the ability to 
communicate effectively.  
 
The relationship between generalised trust and ethno-linguistic fractionalization is more 
modest than for localised trust. Table 3 shows no significant association between generalised 
trust and ethnic fractionalization, and a one standard deviation increase in linguistic 
fractionalization is associated with only a 1½ percentage point fall in generalised trust. If 
inequality and the two measures of ethno-linguistic fractionalization are included together, 
linguistic fractionalization is again negative and statistically significant, while ethnic 
fractionalization is (surprisingly) positive and marginally statistically significant.  
 
Does linguistic fractionalization reduce the level of trust among both natives and non-
natives? To test this, linguistic fractionalization is interacted with a dummy variable for 
whether the respondent is born overseas. For localised trust, a one standard deviation increase 
in linguistic fractionalization is associated with a 5 percentage point fall in trust for those 
born in Australia, and a 9 percentage point fall in trust for those born overseas (Table 2, 
Col 6). Both findings are significant at the 5 percent level or better. However, for generalised 
trust, the effect appears to operate exclusively through those born overseas (Table 3, Col 6). 
Taking these results together, it seems that immigrants who move into linguistically diverse 
neighbourhoods tend to be less trusting than non-immigrants in those communities. There are 
two possible explanations for this effect. It could be that the main mechanism is a selection 
process, through which those immigrants who move into diverse neighbourhoods tend 
themselves to be less trusting. Alternatively, it could be that interactions within geographic 
areas tend to cause neighbourhoods to tip towards either a high-trust or a low-trust 
equilibrium.  
 
How do the coefficients on neighbourhood income, inequality and diversity in the generalised 
trust regressions compare with those found by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) for the US? For 
neighbourhood income, respondents in richer parts of both countries tend to be more trusting, 
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but the magnitude of the effect is larger in the US (a 10 percent rise in average city income is 
associated with an 8 percentage point rise in trust) than in Australia (a 10 percent rise in 
neighbourhood income is associated with a 2 percentage point rise in trust).10 For inequality, 
Alesina and La Ferrara find a significant negative relationship between trust and inequality, 
which disappears once they control for racial diversity; while I find no significant 
relationship between trust and inequality in Australia. This would be consistent with the 
explanation that the apparent inequality/trust correlation in the US is a mere artefact of the 
fact that inequality and racial diversity are strongly related to one another in the US.  
 
For diversity, Alesina and La Ferrara find that what matters most for the US is racial 
fragmentation, while I find that for Australia, linguistic fragmentation is most important. 
However, the coefficients are similar: a one standard deviation increase in racial 
fractionalization is associated with a 3 percentage point fall in generalised trust in the US, 
while a one standard deviation increase in linguistic fractionalization in Australia is 
associated with a 2-4 percentage point fall in generalised trust. However, the causes appear to 
differ – while the US results seem to be driven primarily by the native born population’s 
aversion to heterogeneity, the negative relationship between generalised trust and linguistic 
diversity in Australia appears to operate exclusively through those born overseas.  
 
V. What if Locational Choice is Endogenous? 
 
In the above analysis, I have assumed that neighbourhood characteristics affect levels of trust, 
rather than the reverse. However, it is possible that locality choices are endogenous to 
individuals’ willingness to trust others (for example, less trusting people might prefer to live 
in more heterogeneous neighbourhoods). Failing to take account of this possibility could lead 
to biased estimates of the true neighbourhood effects.  
 
In a paper on ethnic diversity and attitudes towards ethnic minorities, Dustmann and Preston 
(2001) propose a possible solution to the problem of identifying the causal effect of ethnic 
diversity. They posit that families choose where to live at a very local level, but are 
constrained at a regional level – by factors such as a desire to be near their place of work, or 
to be within a reasonable proximity of family and friends. Using data from the U.K., 
                                                 
10 Since Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) include both log median income and log median income2 in their model, 
the effect of a 10 percent increase in a city’s median income is estimated at the sample mean. 
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Dustmann and Preston instrument for racial composition in a ward (average size: 5000 
people) with racial composition in the surrounding district (average size: 125,000 people) or 
county (average size: 1 million people).  
 
A similar approach can be applied in the present case. So far, neighbourhood effects have 
been estimated using neighbourhood units of around 20,000 people. I now calculate measures 
of income and ethnic composition at the regional level, where regions are areas of about 
460,000 people. Regions are either part of a major city, an entire minor city, part of a large 
state, or an entire small state or territory. For example, Parramatta, Tasmania, North 
Queensland and the Gold Coast are all distinct regions. Respondents in the sample are spread 
across 692 neighbourhoods and 52 regions. 
 
Assuming an individual’s neighbourhood (j) may be endogenous, but their region (k) is 
exogenous, I now estimate a two-stage model, in which Yk is a given characteristic of region 
k. 
 
Stage 1: ijkkijkjk YXY νρλ +++=         (2) 
Stage 2:        (3) ijkjkijkijk YXTrustP εβα +++= ˆ)(
 
Given certain limitations with probit IV models, I estimate the equation using two-stage least 
squares, clustering standard errors at the neighbourhood level.11
 
The results from these specifications are shown in Table 4. For localised trust (Panel A), the 
results of the IV specification are similar to the results of the Probit regressions in Table 2. 
The income coefficient remains around 0.2–0.3, and the linguistic heterogeneity coefficient 
remains around -0.05. Both are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. When linguistic 
heterogeneity is interacted with the respondent’s own birthplace, the interaction between 
linguistic heterogeneity and overseas born remains negative, but is no longer statistically 
significant. 
 
                                                 
11 Using the ivprobit command in Stata, it is possible to estimate some of the specifications, but the command 
does not allow the use of analytic weights, and most specifications do not converge. For those that do converge, 
the results are qualitatively similar to the 2SLS results shown in Table 4. Likewise, estimating the specifications 
shown in tables 2 and 3, but using regional characteristics in place of neighbourhood characteristics, produces 
similar results to the 2SLS specification. 
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For generalised trust (Panel B of Table 4), the coefficients for income are similar to those in 
the probit model. However, the coefficients in ethno-linguistic heterogeneity tend to be 
smaller in magnitude, and none are statistically significant. Taken together, the results from 
Table 4 indicate that while localised trust is generally exogenous to locational decisions, 
generalised trust may be endogenous to the neighbourhood in which an individual chooses to 
live. 
 
Table 4: Instrumental Variables Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Localised Trust 
Dependent variable: 0 if agrees that ‘Generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with most people in my 
local area’, 1 if disagrees 
Neighbourhood income 0.193*** 0.233*** 0.344*** 0.284*** 0.309*** 0.272*** 
 (0.065) (0.077) (0.073) (0.068) (0.087) (0.070) 
Inequality  -0.018   -0.013  
  (0.020)   (0.020)  
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.045***  0.001  
   (0.012)  (0.019)  
Linguistic fractionalization    -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.043*** 
    (0.011) (0.018) (0.015) 
Linguistic fractionalization      -0.026 
* Born overseas      (0.022) 
Individual-level controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6500 6500 6500 6500 6500 6500 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Panel B: Generalised Trust 
Dependent variable: 0 if agrees that ‘Generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with most Australians’, 1 
if disagrees 
Neighbourhood income 0.170*** 0.159** 0.178*** 0.185*** 0.141* 0.172*** 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.068) (0.061) (0.073) (0.063) 
Inequality  0.005   0.006  
  (0.017)   (0.017)  
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.003  0.016  
   (0.011)  (0.018)  
Linguistic fractionalization    -0.009 -0.022 0.000 
    (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) 
Linguistic fractionalization      -0.028 
* Born overseas      (0.021) 
Individual-level controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6500 6500 6500 6500 6500 6500 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Sources: 1997-98 Australian Community Survey and 1996 Australian Census.  
Notes: 
1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Coefficients are from a linear 
probability IV model, with region-level characteristics used to instrument for neighbourhood-level 
characteristics. Robust standard errors, clustered at the neighbourhood level, in parentheses.  
2. Inequality, ethnic fractionalization and linguistic fractionalization are normed so that their coefficients 
represent the effect of a one standard deviation increase.  
3. All regressions include the full set of individual-level controls shown in Tables 2 and 3: sex, age, age2, 
whether born overseas, years of education, whether unemployed, whether moved in past 10 years, travel time, 
work time, and indicator variables for the 13 occupational categories listed in the ACS. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored the determinants of localised trust and generalised trust across 
Australia. At an individual level, education and working hours are positively associated with 
trust, while commuting time is negatively associated with trust. Immigrants tend to show less 
localised trust, while the unemployed exhibit less generalised trust. At a neighbourhood level, 
trust is higher in richer neighbourhoods, and lower in ethnically or linguistically 
heterogenous neighbourhoods. The effect of linguistic heterogeneity is stronger on 
immigrants than on the native-born population. There is no apparent relationship between 
inequality and trust across Australian neighbourhoods. On the assumption that mobility 
decisions are constrained at a regional level, I instrument for neighbourhood characteristics 
with regional characteristics. This IV specification supports most of the findings relating to 
localised trust, but in the generalised trust IV specification the coefficients on ethnic and 
linguistic heterogeneity are statistically insignificant. 
 
Given that Australia and the US are both ‘settler societies’ which experienced high levels of 
immigration in the post-war era (Freeman and Jupp 1992), it is perhaps not surprising that 
there is a negative relationship between ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and trust in both 
countries. Yet given the substantial benefits of immigration, reducing ethnic heterogeneity 
would most likely have a net detrimental effect. Instead, policymakers should focus attention 
on the problem itself – building local-level trust in diverse communities. To the extent that 
the marginal returns from community-building programs are higher in neighbourhoods with 
lower levels of trust, these programs should be targeted towards communities that are less 
affluent and more linguistically diverse. 
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